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Autonomous Defense? 
The Role of Military Forces in EU External Affairs 
 
Why has the EU developed a defense dimension that makes military forces an integral part of the EU’s 
external relations and the integration project itself? One answer is that the defense dimension simply is 
a logical consequence of the common foreign and security policy under development since the early 
1990s. Thus, from the Maastricht Treaty’s reference to “the eventual framing of a common defense 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defense,” the EU has gradually embraced defense 
policy. NATO and EU negotiations have at times been tortuous, but at bottom the 1990s could be seen 
as harboring an “ineluctable” trend in Europe toward “emancipation” and “autonomy in defense” 
(Cogan 2001, 134). 
This answer may be inaccurate: “emancipation” – in the sense of US disengagement – may lead to 
disorganization or new types of dependency rather than meaningful autonomy. To probe the substance 
of claims to autonomy I critically assess the motivations that underpin EU defense policy. Why did the 
ESDP come about, and why did all EU states, including states with strong Atlantic ties and traditions of 
neutrality, accept its articulation? The assessment leads to the conclusion that the trend toward 
autonomy may not be so “ineluctable” after all. 
The analysis asks to what extent the ESDP is the outcome of a revisionist reaction to the Atlantic status 
quo.1 Institutions in this framework become focal points for revisionism, especially dominating 
institutions like NATO, because powerful states have used these institutions to limit the choices of less 
powerful states (Gruber 2000).2 There are two basic motivations for opposing an institution like 
NATO.3 First, states may strategically oppose it because they desire a new international order more 
compatible with their domestic ideas and perspectives. Second, states may tactically oppose an 
institution because they feel that it does not do enough to perpetuate the international order. Strategic 
revisionism aims to replace the existing order; tactical revisionism to reform it. 
Change in the dominant order (i.e., NATO’s position) requires a weakening of “strategic” support, 
which in turn inspires “tactical” revisionism. The emergence of new institutions (i.e., the EU’s ESDP) 
is thereby facilitated but its strength and durability depends on the compatibility of state preferences 
(Tams 1999).4 In short, an institution that rests on a fragile constellation of motivations—tactical and 
                                                 
1 I rely on classical realist theory. Classical realism is “classical” because it aims to understand the meanings 
behind social action, thus to interpret human beliefs, values, hopes and fear, and believes that social science is 
inherently imperfect because human relations are in flux (Jackson 1996, 208-209; Bull 1966). Classical realism is 
“realist” because it is views the world as a potentially dangerous place characterized by group competition and the 
absence of authority (anarchy). Since social action is meaningful, however, “sound political thought must be based 
on elements of both utopia and reality” (Carr 1991, 93), and sound analysis must examine both power and purpose. 
2 Institutions are thus seen as reflections of underlying power structures. This is in contrast to neo-liberalism and 
neo-realism where institutions are seen as frameworks for distributing gains from cooperation. 
3 I argue like Hoffmann (1974, 368) and Gruber (2000, 259) that people who govern are strongly constrained by 
their “national situation” but also capable of articulating distinct policies within it. 
4 Tams (1999, 81) argues that “state preferences for institutional form vary with preferences for institutional 
functions.” In other words, what institutions are supposed to do is more important to states than their form. This 
point ties in with the use of strategic and tactical motives in this analysis (these motives pointing to different 
institutional functions). The approach is rooted in classical realist theory, as noted in footnote 1, but also in the 
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strategic revisionism—will itself be fragile. I arrive at the conclusion that the ESDP rests on such 
fragile foundations and that Europe in many ways has been brought back to the 1950s. Governments 
are faced with an opportunity to organize a European defense—currently the ESDP; in the 1950s the 
European Defense Community—but a failure to agree will, like in the 1950s, hand the initiative back to 
NATO. 
Four analytical sections trace the evolution of revisionism and status quo up through the 1990s. The 
first section examines the way in which NATO emerged as dominant in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War and thus overshadowed the EU’s new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). NATO 
was supported because a few states made a strategic commitment to it while other allies relied on habit 
rather than strategic analysis. Revisionism thus had little impact. The second section analyses the 
creation of a European pillar within NATO in the mid-1990s. Strategic support for NATO had 
weakened and gave new credence to European revisionism in modest doses. The third section then 
investigates how this pillar moved from NATO into the EU in the shape of the ESDP. I find that 
ambiguous strategic support for NATO combined with tactical revisionism created the momentum that 
led to the ESDP. The momentum was not one of strategic revisionism, however, and the final section 
reflects on the future trajectory of European defense and the role of military forces in EU external 
affairs in light of US preeminence, the fight against terrorism, and EU enlargement. 
 
NATO’s preeminence, 1989-1993 
The European Union came into being in the early 1990s when geopolitical upheaval invited change in 
foreign policies and institutional designs. NATO was not, however, overshadowed by the EU, 
primarily because the strategic support for NATO was strong and strategic revisionism failed to 
mobilize support. Before specifying this argument I examine the evolution of the EU’s security 
dimension and NATO in this period. 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) (EU 1993) contains in Title V provisions for a CFSP that builds 
on previous political cooperation (EPC) and its provisions in the Single European Act (Title III). 
Article J.4 of the TEU states ambitiously that the CFSP concerns “all questions related to the security 
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to 
a common defense.” To realize the CFSP the member states can take “common positions,” which refer 
to EPC practice, with member states being urged to take into account these positions in their national 
                                                                                                                                            
Weberian concept of “elective affinity.” Weber argued that religious and economic ideas may attract each other; 
here I argue that ideas embedded in institutions may attract—or repulse—actors depending on political ideas 
developed within their “national situation.” As Max Weber (1978, 911) argued, “the striving for prestige pertains 
to all specific power structures and hence to all political structures.” The question here is whether states as political 
structures find it possible and desirable to strive for prestige within certain institutions, and to which extent they 
can mobilize support for institutional change. 
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policies. Member states, as a new measure, can also resort to “joint actions,” which are “operational” 
initiatives that “bind” member state policies (art. J.3 and J.4). 
To realize the defense dimension, the EU member states made reference to the Western European 
Union (WEU), which was endowed with the responsibility of elaborating and implementing defense 
policies (art. J.7). The WEU on its part, with a membership that was not fully congruent with that of the 
EU, decided six months after the signing of the TEU to articulate its understanding of defense policy. 
In its Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 the WEU singled out “humanitarian actions, peacekeeping 
and –making operations” as its specialty (WEU 1992). In brief, the WEU situated itself in the crisis 
management area located between the foreign policy of the CFSP and the traditional conception of 
defense associated with NATO. 
These advances – the CFSP coupled with the WEU – were ambiguous. Observers did not fail to notice 
that the voting procedure behind the “joint actions” was tortuous and the concept of joint action itself 
poorly defined. Treaty provisions, in short, “give rise to grave doubts about their practicability” 
(Edwards and Nuttall 1994, 95). Moreover, the poor integration of defense into the CFSP and the 
uncertainty surrounding the WEU’s long term role – the TEU referred this question to the next 
intergovernmental conference of 1996-1997 – bore witness to underlying disunity. 
 
NATO, the US, and France 
CFSP agreement was weak because most political effort was channeled into the reconfiguration of 
NATO. The US was a prime mover behind the rejuvenation of the Atlantic Alliance and its adaptation 
to the new Europe. NATO, in short, was a key pillar in the vision of a new world order that President 
Bush announced in the wake of the Gulf War in early 1991. Previous to this vision the Bush 
administration had demonstrated its determination to make NATO the primary interlocutor of the 
Soviet Union (which became Russia in December 1991), the institutional anchor for a united Germany, 
and the framework for allied defense planning. In all respects US policy ran up against French designs 
for a new European order. 
The question of securing NATO’s preeminence in relation to the Soviet Union became acute already in 
1988-1989. At this stage the Gorbachev vision of a “common European house,” launched in the mid-
1980s, spread to Western Europe. In his speech to the UN in December 1988 Gorbachev linked 
unilateral military cuts to a vision of “defensive defense” and “mutual security” that, in effect, was 
Gorbachev’s strategy for negotiating “the entry of the Soviet Union into the Western-led community” 
(Blacker 1993, 105). This entry, likely along with a new security architecture, was a challenge to 
NATO. 
There were indications that Gorbachev’s revisionism found support among important NATO allies. 
German Foreign Minister Genscher argued “consistently that a stable post-cold war European order 
had to include at its heart the Soviet Union as an equal partner in the management of European 
security” (Forster and Niblett 2001, 28). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) was in many ways an ideal framework for such a vision. The CSCE combined arms control 
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and humanitarian issues in a “package” in which all NATO and Warsaw Pact members took part. 
Humanitarian agreement was encouraged by Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and culminated, via a 
series of Conferences on the Human Dimension, in the Copenhagen Document of June 1990 – 
representing “the essence of Western democratic practice” (Dean 1994, 210). Arms control conducted 
under the auspices of the CSCE expanded past confidence building measures to arrive at regional 
conventional force limits written into the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 
1990.  
France supported this new CSCE role because it could provide the framework of stability within which 
the Soviet Union (Russia) along with newly independent states could articulate peaceful policies, while 
European integration continued deepening as a means to anchor Germany in strong institutions. 
Deepening led to the European Union. Widening, Mitterrand suggested in his New Year’s speech, 31 
December 1989, should be the task of a “European Confederation.” This vision, rooted in past French 
designs of an European order from the Atlantic to the Urals (Rupnik 1998, 200), was subsequently 
strongly criticized for excluding Eastern Europe from the EU hothouse of integration, but it was, 
according to Mitterrand’s advisor, conceived of to support Gorbachev and the role of the CSCE 
(Védrine 1996, 446).  
Yet the combined EU-WEU-CSCE challenge to NATO failed to make a dent and NATO instead 
emerged strengthened. This is visible notably in two respects. First, NATO in November 1991 agreed 
to a new Strategic Concept that acknowledges the role of other institutions such as the EU and the 
CSCE but then stated that NATO, in terms of “membership” and “capabilities” is in a position to 
perform all security functions5 and must remain “the essential forum for consultation among the Allies” 
(NATO 1991b, paragraph 21). NATO’s fundamental role in European security was further enhanced 
during 1992 when the Alliance decided to offer itself for out-of-area crisis management operations 
authorized by the United Nations. The North Atlantic Council offered first in June 1992 to support 
CSCE peacekeeping activities, then followed up in December 1992 with a similar but by nature also 
more general commitment to UN.6 From November 1991 to December 1992 NATO effectively agreed 
to be the cornerstone of European security and also to enter the new and pressing business of 
peacekeeping. 
Second, NATO reformed its military infrastructure to match these new political designs. NATO’s 
Defense Planning Committee (DPC) argued already in May 1990 that the greater use of multinational 
forces was desirable, not least because they would prevent the integrated military structures from 
disintegrating (Smith 2000, 68). A month later the North Atlantic Council endorsed a thorough going 
                                                 
5 These security functions refer to four “fundamental tasks” identified in the Strategic Concept (paragraph 20): to 
provide one of the indispensable pillars of European security, to provide a transatlantic forum for security 
consultations, to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state, 
and to preserve the strategic balance within Europe.  
6 Out-of-area refers to Article 6 of the NATO Treaty defining the area from within which armed attacks on one or 
more members are deemed an attack on all. The area is essentially the national territories, the Mediterranean Sea, 
and the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. Logically, the NATO allies always had the possibility of 
conducting out-of-area operations in unity by invoking the consultation clause in Article 4 and then deciding on 
common action. However, the events of 1992 remain important because they turn this implicit possibility into an 
explicit and mutually recognized option (Dean 1994, 256-257). 
 6
reform in this direction (NATO 1991a, paragraph 9). In a new force structure NATO would be able to 
call on “augmentation forces” from the US to assist “main defense forces” within Europe, but the real 
novelty was found in the organization of Rapid Reaction Forces. A part of these forces was a creature 
of the past – the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) – but a significant new force came into 
being – the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) – and was composed of a series of national divisions 
along with a new multinational division (Smith 2000, 84). 
NATO’s vigor and the relative weakness of the CFSP were not least the result of the US’s strategic 
support for NATO and its consistent opposition to autonomous European defense plans. Since France 
was the lead country behind the autonomous option, US policy to a great extent targeted France. The 
US sought to grant NATO a new political and military role where France wished to maintain NATO as 
a territorial defense framework out of which new institutions could spring. Controversy ensued. In 
October 1990, after having outlined his New Atlanticist vision to French President Mitterrand in the 
spring, President Bush suggested, to Mitterrand’s great consternation, that significant EC initiatives 
should be coordinated with the US (Védrine 1996, 444). During the Gulf War, in February 1991, a 
warning delivered to European governments by US Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs 
Reginald Bartholomew was in Paris seen as a manifestation of American triumphalism (Cogan 2001, 
49). Mitterrand later recalled that the US, in their bilateral diplomacy as well as through NATO, 
“increased political pressure” to make sure they could control European developments. “The 
propositions of George Bush … limited the freedom of action of our common institutions [the EU], in 
particular the first link in a common defense” (Mitterrand 1996, 138). 
 
NATO and Europe 
Allied governments reacting according to old habit reinforced the US position. Great Britain was 
naturally important as a key ally within NATO, and as a key military actor. Prime Minister Thatcher 
reacted to German unification and the Franco-German decision to respond to it by deepening the EC 
with rejection rather than vision. Thatcher recalls being dismayed at Mitterrand’s dismissal of her offer 
to create a new balance of power against the greater Germany: Mitterrand allegedly thereby betrayed 
the Gaullist “defence of French sovereignty” in favor of “a federal Europe” (Thatcher 1993, 791 and 
798). Habit did not prevent Great Britain from acting quickly and decisively within NATO, however. 
By jumping “very very very quickly” according to a NATO official, Great Britain secured the 
command of NATO’s new ARRC and thus a prominent position in the new NATO (Smith 2000, 77). 
Still, the legacy of Thatcher’s longstanding hostility to European integration prevented British policy-
makers, also after her political fall in November 1990, from lifting “their eyes to the broader picture” 
and redefine British policy on NATO and the EU (Forster and Wallace 2001, 144).  
Other states rallied to the American position because of transatlantic habits. Naturally, allies like 
Turkey and Norway were always inclined to support the US and NATO in light of their lacking 
membership of the EU and their focus on territorial defense for obvious geographical reasons. Small 
countries like the Benelux, with their strong atlanticist traditions, or Denmark, where atlanticism 
historically has been checked by traditions of neutrality, saw in the US presence a means to balance the 
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political influence of big neighbors. One might add that the general inability of the large EU countries 
to take control of their involvement in the break-up of Yugoslavia in the course of 1991 eroded 
confidence in their leadership capacity and certainly made the US victory in the Gulf War, not even a 
year earlier, appear all the more impressive. 
France was not alone in supporting the CFSP, however – in that case it would never have materialized 
– but it was difficult, if not impossible for France to mold this support into a coherent whole. France 
supported full governmental control of the CFSP, which was also the outcome in the EU’s second 
pillar, and received support from Great Britain. Britain, however, opposed any tight connection 
between the EU and the WEU, as did Portugal, Denmark, and Ireland. Similarly, France supported the 
greater autonomy of the EU in CFSP affairs, and in this received support from Germany, Spain, 
Belgium, and Italy. By insisting on an intergovernmental pillar, however, France came into conflict 
with the more federalist ambition of these countries.7 
The lack of French alignment with the policies of Germany and Spain deserve a further comment 
because it reveals a basic ambiguity in French policy that policy-makers of that era simply failed to 
address. France wanted more Europe but feared that France would lose as Europe gained. This was a 
different and negative vision that did not dominate in Berlin and Madrid.  
Germany wanted both NATO and the EU in the belief that Germany would gain in the process. 
Germany thus played its traditional straddling role between France and the US. With France, Germany 
became the engine in the drive for political and economic union, repeatedly setting an ambitious 
defense agenda and offering to upgrade Franco-German military cooperation in order to replace French 
(occupation) forces stationed on German soil. This upgrade took the shape of a Eurocorps that, when 
announced in October 1991, appeared to be a force structure intended to balance NATO’s new force 
structure, announced May 1991.8 But Germany never wavered on its political commitment to NATO9 
and militarily remained fully integrated with the NATO force structure, taking command of the air 
component of the ARRC and participating in the organization of multinational units in support of 
NATO’s “main defense forces.” 
Spain was an enthusiastic supporter of European integration in the context of Maastricht and even 
supported the creation of a Common Defense Policy along with a shared and integrated EU military 
structure (Holman 1996, 119). Spain also shared the French dislike for NATO for the reason that the 
US had long cooperated with Franco, against which the new political leadership reacted. Yet there was 
no strategic agreement between Paris and Madrid, albeit Spain generally supported Franco-German 
initiatives. Spain supported a degree of military “integration” that France since 1954 (EDC) and 1966 
(NATO) has explicitly rejected, and it is doubtful that Paris took the “Latin option” seriously.  
                                                 
7 For an overview of the Maastricht negotiations see Pryce 1994. 
8 This Franco-German declaration did not emerge as a bolt out of the blue in Washington because it had been 
presented to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft ten days earlier (Védrine 1996, 466). Scowcroft “strongly 
wished” for the EC/EU to refrain from making the WEU its defense instrument, something which the French 
government resisted, but which was picked up by Great Britain and also Italy in the concluding negotiations on the 
EU-WEU relationship.  
9 If it did on occasions in 1990 it was for tactical reasons and in order to gain diplomatic support from the Soviet 
Union (see Zelikow and Rice 1998, xi).  
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Gabriel Robin, French Ambassador to NATO 1987-1993, argues that the French leadership at this 
stage was so confident that “the tide of history” favored France and French designs that they simply 
adopted a passive attitude (Robin 1996). France thus entered the NATO reform process late, in March 
1991. Once inside, it managed to obtain some recognition of NATO’s European security and defense 
identity (ESDI) but it was too little too late. NATO was reformed and reinvigorated while France 
struggled to reach a new deal with European partners on the CFSP.  
If NATO was in command in the course of 1992, one might in conclusion ask why the WEU managed 
to agree to a crisis management “Petersberg” agenda in June 1992. The agreement was not due to an 
overlooked residue of revisionism. Petersberg was essentially a reaction of the member states to the 
agenda set earlier in the same month by NATO, that out-of-area missions needed to be taken into 
account by the Western allies. Moreover, Germany, host to the Petersberg summit, used the occasion to 
promote full transparency in the European debate vis-à-vis the US and other NATO members, and thus 
succeeded in obtaining US consent to the Petersberg agenda (Laurent 2001, 151). Petersberg left the 
WEU with a minor role in relation to NATO, whose privileged domain of heavy military operations 
and territorial defense was undisputed, and represented as much a transatlantic as a European 
compromise. Typical of the German role in creating consensus, in the fall of 1992 France resigned to 
the inevitable and agreed with Germany to assign the French-German Eurocorps to NATO as well as to 
EU missions (Le Monde, 2 October 1992). 
The CFSP had thus come into being in the period 1989-1993 but it was a promise with an uncertain 
potential. Decision-making procedures were tortuous and defense policy was deposited in the WEU, 
which lacked significant political support. Thanks to US and German strategic support, along with 
British and other support rooted in habit rather than vision, and to divisions within the camp of 
Europeanists, NATO emerged reinforced. In 1993 the EU had few if any prospects of involving 
military force in its external affairs, and it appeared much more likely that NATO would exert 
influence on the EU’s CFSP in the context of crisis management. 
 
NATO’s European pillar, 1994-1997 
The mid-1990s witnessed the continued strengthening of NATO and lingering in European defense 
cooperation. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 only marginally strengthened the CFSP, and the WEU 
was drawn into NATO’s rather than the EU’s orbit. By 1997 it appeared that the EU was destined to 
become a “civilian actor” relying on occasional backup from NATO and lacking the ability to realize 
the Maastricht defense ambition. Why did this happen? First of all because American strategic 
leadership continued and in fact provided a blueprint for a way in which a reformed NATO could serve 
regional security tasks. Moreover, revisionism in Europe was at a low tide. American involvement in 
the Dayton peace settlement of 1995 seemed to demonstrate the futility of “autonomy,” and the key 
revisionist proponent, France, was engaged in domestic military reforms that led to a rapprochement 
with NATO. Revisionism, from France and beyond, now took the shape of demands for greater “voice” 
within NATO. However, US policy-makers, with great faith in their design for a new NATO, found 
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few problems in arresting European revolt by arguing that influence must be based on capability, 
something which the Europeans notoriously lack in comparison with the US. 
 
Advances in Amsterdam 
The Amsterdam Treaty (EU 1997) essentially made a few modest advances on the CFSP and largely 
left defense policy outside its framework. The CFSP was strengthened in a number of respects. First, 
greater flexibility was introduced in CFSP decision-making. Qualified majority voting (QMV) now 
applied not only to the implementation of “joint actions” but also to the adoption of a joint action itself 
if it follows from a “common strategy” adopted by the European Council (Article 23.2).10 Moreover, 
flexibility was enhanced as member states now could abstain from joining CFSP decisions. This is 
known as “constructive abstention” according to which members will not be obliged to accept a 
decision but allows it to move forward (Article 23.1). The CFSP was strengthened also by the 
appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP who henceforth represents the day-to-day nub of 
CFSP affairs, and is in this role strengthened by his dual capacity as Secretary General of the Council.  
These advances were checked by elaborate opt-out mechanisms, however. Constructive abstention and 
QMV were balanced by the possibility to defer votes in cases where important “reasons of national 
policy” are in play (Article 23.2). Likewise, QMV in joint action follows only once a “strategy” has 
been adopted by unanimity and is in any case hostage to the same national security opt-out clause.  
Advances in the defense area were even more modest. Perhaps the most significant advance concerned 
the incorporation into the EU of the Petersberg tasks: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Article 17.2). 
However, the relationship between the EU and the WEU remained unresolved (Article 17.1). Although 
the WEU was “an integral part of the development of the Union,” it remained on the sideline and a 
rapprochement required unanimity in the European Council. 
The Amsterdam Treaty had thus delivered little of the improvements outlined in original agenda, and 
the defense arm, the WEU, had instead been drawn much closer to NATO, as we will see below. As 
Jean Klein (1997, 199) observed, “we must recognize the fact that the CFSP is malfunctioning and that 
NATO represents the only remaining military structure in Europe.” EU defense problems were once 
again intimately connected to NATO’s vigor. The status quo was significantly stronger than 
revisionism. 
 
US and NATO’s European Pillar 
A shift in US policy explains much of this development. It occurred most visible when the US became 
engaged on the ground in Bosnia as a consequence of its decision to promote a peace settlement, the 
Dayton agreement of November 1995. But the shift had been in the making before the fall of 1995. It 
had begun in late 1993 when the Clinton administration reacted to allied acrimony in the context of 
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Yugoslav crisis management and sought to demonstrate that NATO was an alliance of substantial as 
well as symbolic value. The root problem was the US insistence on NATO’s primacy while developing 
crisis management policies that the European allies saw as threatening to their own security.11 In late 
1993 the Clinton administration shifted stance and suggested a transatlantic bargain: it, the US, would 
help NATO become a useful tool for managing European security, including creating partnership 
agreements with Central and East European countries, and in return the EU would take the lead on 
managing the economic transformation in these same countries (Laurent 2001, 152). 
NATO’s geographical outreach thus began with Partnership for Peace programs that in January 1994 
were offered to all former Warsaw Pact members, and President Clinton indicated that NATO 
enlargement no longer was a question of “whether” but “when and how.” Once Clinton had assembled 
a domestic majority and taken the lead on creating a NATO-Russia agreement allowing the 
enlargement to move ahead, NATO in 1996-1997 provided answers to the “when and how” (see 
Goldgeier 1999). 
But the old European allies were also concerned to secure an alliance that would allow them to operate 
and solve concrete problems. The US again took the lead with the development of a Combined Joint 
Task Force (CJTF), presented in October 1993 and endorsed by NATO at a summit in January 1994.12 
A flexible military infrastructure would naturally lend itself to enhanced “European” action, but, being 
proposed by the US, there is no doubt that American policy-makers perceived above all that the 
concept would be useful for NATO as a whole. 
Filling in the NATO framework was then a question of recognizing the need for a stronger European 
pillar. This recognition was also forthcoming in January 1994 when the NATO heads of state declared 
(NATO 1994, paragraphs 4-5): 
We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity 
which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common 
defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence 
compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance 
We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western 
European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European 
Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this.  
                                                                                                                                            
10 Common Strategies adopted by the European Council were also a novelty introduced by the treaty. 
11 Specifically, the US advocated in early 1993 a policy of “lift and strike” in Bosnia at a time when European 
allies had forces on the ground. European governments feared that the lifting of the arms embargo along with 
NATO strikes would increase fighting and make European peacekeepers targets in it. 
12 The CJTF concept was not new within the US armed forces where it had represented an effort to enhance 
interoperationability. In NATO the concept took on a slightly different meaning, not least because of the alliance’s 
multinational setting. A “task force” is defined as a group organized for a specific operation of a limited duration. 
It is “joint” when two or more military services participate (army, navy, and air), and it is “combined” when 
several nations participate. Out-of-area operations, the argument was, could be undertaken only by several 
countries at a time, and these countries were likely to offer disparate forces for the task. Concretely, CJTF work 
within NATO focused on developing headquarters that, apart from a permanent skeleton staff, would be able to 
operate with changing services and nationalities. These headquarters, moreover, would be geographically mobile, 
unlike NATO headquarters during the Cold War. 
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The path for operational flexibility in NATO was henceforth the implementation of the CJTF concept 
combined with a better integration of WEU and NATO planning, naturally with NATO as the 
framework organization. At a European political level, however, a much more complex debate on 
flexibility took off. 
 
Flexible Europe? 
Multi-speed Europe was the subject matter of a paper presented by the German CDU-CSU in 
September 1994, and it drew wide attention because it was correctly seen as defining a new theme in 
European integration. The debate subsequently split between those who believed in “reinforced 
cooperation” – a semi-institutional avant-garde capable of driving the integration process forward – and 
the adherents of “flexibility” – a more de-centralized model according to which states could opt in or 
out of varying issue areas. A “Reflection Group” preparing the Amsterdam negotiations turned out to 
be prophetic by arguing that flexibility should be a “last resort” option open in principle to everyone 
and always undertaken in respect for the acquis communautaire (Missiroli 2000, 6). The Reflection 
Group’s minimalist version prevailed for reasons of political disagreement.13 Britain and Greece 
consistently opposed the idea of flexibility within security and defense affairs while others were 
ambivalent in light of the prospect that they might be left behind in a structure increasingly dominated 
by a “CFSP directorate.”14  
In the end the debate over defense, security, and flexibility was postponed – flexibility was adopted in a 
minimalist version and did not apply to defense policy, of which the EU had none – because EU 
members focused on the EMU and feared that institutional overload would endanger the monetary 
“revolutionary step forward” (Forster and Niblett 2001, 40).  
The WEU-EU relationship therefore floundered. Britain was strongly opposed to the idea of bringing 
the WEU into the EU at this time. Britain favored flexibility in its most de-centralized version and saw 
no need to create a structure, such as the EU-WEU, that one day might rival NATO. It was a policy 
crafted by “tacticians” in which “long-term thinking” was “abandoned,” concluded two observers 
(Forster and Wallace 2001, 142). Still, Britain was joined in its opposition to WEU-EU integration by 
the neutral countries – Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland – and they combined were able to defeat 
the coalition for integration that formed in March 1997 and which included France, Germany, Spain, 
Italy, and Luxembourg (see Klein 1997, 195-196).15 
France and Spain, two integration proponents, are illustrative of the underlying reality of NATO 
preeminence even in the debate on the European pillar. Both countries in this period significantly 
strengthened their relations to NATO in recognition of its operational superiority and thus the potential 
loss of influence resulting from standing apart. France began a process of NATO rapprochement 
                                                 
13 As Missiroli (2000, 7) notes, the issue was widely recognized as extremely sensitive and no less than twenty-two 
documents along with a number of “non-papers” were submitted on the matter by the negotiating governments. 
14 Denmark would no doubt have joined them had it not been for the Danish defense opt-out dating back to the 
Danish ratification of the TEU.  
15 The coalition formed on the basis of a French-German proposal of December 1996. 
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following the election of President Chirac in 1995, leading to the full participation of France in 
NATO’s military command structure in the case of out-of-area operations. There is little doubt that the 
process was destined to go further: France was ready for full integration, thus also in the defense 
planning process, if NATO in return “Europeanized” its command structure. In the fall of 1995 France 
returned to the Military Committee and agreed to let its defense minister participate in the North 
Atlantic Council: it was even ready to discuss nuclear issues within NATO, traditionally a taboo within 
the French culture of independence. The new relationship failed to run its full course, however, because 
the command issue became a “test of wills” between France and the US (Tiersky 1997, 55). The many 
complex political reasons for this deadlock need not concern us here, more important is the fact that 
even France recognized that NATO had become the defining military framework. 
Spain, like France, warmed to NATO but, unlike France, saw the process to its end: Spain integrated 
fully with NATO’s military command in 1997. The contrast to Spain’s previous ambition at Maastricht 
to create an EU military structure is significant. Spain now saw NATO not only as a temporary home 
for “Europeanization” but as a useful alliance in itself. The Atlantic turn in Spanish policy had several 
sources. Spain had been excluded from the Contact Group of big countries dealing with the former 
Yugoslavia, thus causing traditional Spanish hostility to “flexible European integration” to increase. A 
political change of government in Spain in 1996 enabled decision-makers to rely on new political 
constituencies and more clearly articulate an alliance policy of engagement (Niblett 2001, 225).16 
 
Challenges to the NATO Framework 
NATO’s embrace of the WEU therefore continued unabated. In 1996-1997 the WEU was effectively 
incorporated into NATO’s defense planning process, perhaps the clearest sign that the NATO 
machinery was dominant. In 1997 the WEU provided an input to NATO’s Ministerial Guidance – 
which is at the heart of the defense planning process – in order for this Guidance to contain a special 
section on European-led operations. This decision was, in fact, the outcome of the January 1994 
summit decision to develop NATO’s European pillar.  
In June 1996 the pillar took more concrete shape when NATO allies agreed to develop ESDI further on 
the basis, again, of the CJTF concept and specifically invited the WEU to become part of the planning 
process (NATO 1996, paragraphs 7-8). WEU members responded positively in November 1996 by 
noting that they “agreed that it would be valuable for WEU to become actively involved in the 
Alliance’s defense planning process in order to make use of this important tool for improving 
operational effectiveness” (WEU 1996, paragraph 15). From this point on the WEU was drawn into 
NATO planning, and NATO was the only credible military structure thanks to its increasingly flexible 
command arrangements along with the multinational and rapid reaction forces assigned to it.  
                                                 
16 Niblett (2001, 226) notes that the policy soon paid off: Spanish candidates were selected in the following years 
for the positions as NATO Secretary General, EU Chief Representative in Bosnia, and EU special envoy to the 
Middle East. In short, “by assiduously improving its relations with the United States, [Spain] had carved out an 
influential place for itself alongside the group of leading powers in Europe.” 
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These events were driven by the US strategic commitment to NATO through reform. As in the early 
1990s, the US received strong support from Britain and other Atlanticist allies who saw a virtue in 
NATO’s continued operation not only for symbolic reasons but also for the very practical purpose of 
engaging the US on the ground in areas like Bosnia and thus assuring that the allies operate together 
rather than in opposition. Neutral members of the EU likewise saw no need to develop defense policies 
within the EU. Potential and real revisionists were again hampered by their disagreement on EU 
developments and particularly the question of who should lead if the US does not. France, Tiersky 
concludes (1997, 55), wanted to be seen as America’s crucial European diplomatic and military 
partner, but as the flexibility debate revealed, the fear of a European directorate developing represented 
a formidable barrier to this French policy. Most allies de facto regarded the US as their most important 
“European” ally. 
Important questions needed to be addressed at this stage, however, and this in spite of NATO’s 
apparent vigor. For one thing, was the US willing to follow through on its strategic leadership and 
articulate policies that take European points of view into account? The question was of essence because 
the new NATO of 1995-1996 was in many respects the outcome of an American recognition that 
continued US leadership depended on its recognition of a European pillar within the Alliance. Having 
secured the formal possibility for such a “separable but not separate” pillar would the US deliver in 
terms of policy? There were troubling signs already at this stage, according to Stanley Hoffmann 
(2000, 194): the US had run the show at Dayton in 1995 virtually unilaterally, the Dayton plan was 
essentially a re-write of earlier European proposals but now presented as an American document; and 
the US refused to consider European options for a wider enlargement of NATO in 1997. Still, the US 
had secured support for the “new” NATO and had at least a fine opportunity to substantiate its strategic 
design. 
Another important question concerned institutional capacity. NATO had many advantages compared to 
the EU’s convoluted decision-making procedures and lack of a substantial organizational 
infrastructure. The EU’s High Representative, backed by a new Policy Unit and the Council secretariat, 
was not in the league of NATO with its international staff in Bruxelles and its extensive military 
expertise located in the commands of SHAPE, Mons, and SACLANT, Norfolk. In addition, as we have 
seen, the WEU was being integrated with NATO rather than the EU. But would it work? Would this 
impressive set-up deliver the capabilities and command arrangements needed to undertake European 
crisis management operations? 
Problems arose in both respects in 1998-1999. They were in fact the root cause of the diplomatic 
constellations that produced the “autonomous” defense option in the shape of ESDP. However, the 
constellations are fundamentally fragile, as the next section argues. 
 
Out of NATO into the EU, 1998-2001 
NATO did not emerge unscathed from the turn of the century and the EU instead gained supposedly 
“autonomous” capabilities. This development was caused by the nature of the US strategic 
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commitment to NATO: it weakened in terms of practical policy in Kosovo, as US policymakers fought 
a campaign in disregard of European capabilities and frequent strategic objections. NATO was also 
weakened by the inertia of its organization: by being difficult to reform it lost support from otherwise 
pro-NATO countries, especially Britain, that then channeled defense efforts into the EU in order to 
salvage transatlantic relations. This latter shift had begun before the Kosovo crisis erupted, notably in 
1997-1998, but the Kosovo experience significantly enhanced its momentum. 
 
European Security and Defense Policy 
The EU’s newfound “autonomy” refers to the development of a security and defense policy (ESDP) 
that is situated within the EU, unlike the European identity (ESDI) rooted in NATO. The ESDP, 
moreover, is supposed to be operational, a real policy of execution, compared to the ESDI’s emphasis 
on “identity.” In the following I briefly introduce three facets of the ESDP: policy, organization, and 
military capability. 
The political roots are not new: they are essentially the Petersberg crisis management tasks of 1992. In 
1992 the WEU articulated these tasks to keep up with NATO in out-of-area debates; in 1997 the tasks 
were brought inside the EU; and in 1999 the EU moved closer to developing the capacity to actually 
carry out these policies. A first step occurred in early December 1998 when Great Britain and France in 
St. Malo agreed that the EU should be better capable of playing “its full role on the international stage” 
(Britain 1998). More specifically (1998, paragraph 2): “the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” 
This ambition to develop a capacity for autonomous action was then endorsed by all EU countries at 
their Cologne summit in June 1999, and it has since been the guiding light for the ESDP. The 
coronation of diplomatic efforts came in December 2000 when the Nice Treaty was negotiated, leading 
to the declaration that the CFSP now includes “the progressive framing of a defense policy” (EU 2001, 
Article 17). In respect of the upper limit of the Petersberg tasks, involving peacemaking but not war 
and collective defense, the treaty goes on to say that “a common defense” is not part of the policy, and 
also that the ESDP does not prejudice other engagements in, e.g., NATO. 
The organization of the ESDP begins at the summit with of heads of state and then descends to the 
foreign ministers of the Council of Ministers. Foreign ministers are joined by their defense colleagues 
in cases of military crisis management. The real innovative steps have been taken below these political 
levels. A “political pillar” has been constructed to offer decision-makers advise and enhance their 
operational control. This pillar includes a Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is 
subordinated to the permanent ambassadors (COREPER) just below the Council. PSC meets weekly to 
discuss ESDP affairs and exercises strategic control with ESDP operations. PSC is informed by the 
 15
national chiefs of staff, the highest military authorities, who meet in the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC).17 
A “bureaucratic pillar” runs in parallel and is headed by the Council’s Secretary General (currently 
Javier Solana) who is also CFSP High Representative. The only organizational innovation in this pillar 
since St. Malo has been the establishment of an EU Military Staff (EUMS) composed of approximately 
130 national officers. Solana formally heads the EUMS but it also refers directly to the EUMC.18  
Finally, in terms of military capabilities the EU has organized a force planning process. The starting 
point was the “Headline Goal” outlined in Helsinki in December 1999: the members should by 2003 
“be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out 
in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 
brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons)” (EU 1999, annex 1 to annex IV). It should be noted that the EU 
also operates with civilian capabilities as a second capability leg of the ESDP. These involve the four 
dimensions of police forces, justice, protection, and administration. At the Feira summit in June 2000 
the EU articulated a headline goal for police forces, aiming to be ready by 2003 to deploy up to 5000 
policemen (see Hansen and Klynge 2001, chapter 4).  
Since then the EU has negotiated the organization of a “capability development mechanism” that is 
supposed to provide a permanent “method” – its precise institutional contours are precisely the reason 
why agreement is delayed – for reaching the Headline Goal (Rynning forthcoming). At present the EU, 
in this case the EUMS, operates with force catalogues indicating what the EU wants (Petersberg 
mission capabilities), what they have, and what they need.19 Table 1 presents an overview of the ESDP. 
 
Table 1 
ESDP 
 
Policy Organization Capabilities 
 
Petersberg tasks: humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks, and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, 
incl. peacemaking. 
 
Strategy by heads of state; 
 
“Political pillar” with Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) 
and Military Committee 
(EUMC) 
 
“Bureaucratic pillar” headed by 
Secretary General with Military 
 
Military ambition: to be able to 
deploy up to 60,000 troops in 
area of hostility. Permanent 
force planning mechanism is 
under development 
 
Civilian ambition: broad 
                                                 
17 Naturally, the chiefs of staff mostly rely on permanent representatives. 
18 The PSC, EUMC, and EUMS were all mentioned in the Cologne declaration of June 1999. They were then set 
up on an interim basis in early 2000 before being permanently established at the Nice December 2000 summit. 
These organs take over the planning functions of the WEU, which henceforth is fully marginalized within 
European security. The WEU will only contain some armaments cooperation, a defense clause (Article V), and a 
parliamentary assembly, although the latter is likely to whither. 
19 These three catalogues are the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, the Headline Force Catalogue, and the Helsinki 
Progress Catalogue. 
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decisions by ministers Staff (EUMS) involvement in policing and 
administrative reconstruction 
 
 
 
A New Special Relationship? 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section the ESDP was made possible by a simultaneous shift in 
US strategic support for NATO and a tactical adjustment in Europe, especially in Britain, in favor of 
the ESDP. British motives had much to do with transatlantic cooperation. As Jolyon Howorth (2000, 
34) notes, Tony Blair had reached the conclusion that the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance now 
depended on the strengthening of the ESDP. This conclusion was reached because the US increasingly 
emphasized a security agenda foreign to European states, and also because the EU was seen as a more 
flexible framework for obtaining military advances. 
The government of Tony Blair was elected in mid-1997, and it needed slightly more than a year to 
articulate its new approach to European security. What happened through this year, from mid-1997 to 
mid-1998? Above all, events of this year occurred on the background of Bosnia intervention where the 
US had arrived late and then with so overwhelming power that European diplomacy was sidetracked. 
In fact, even the British military felt sidetracked.20 These experiences were less traumatic in light of the 
Berlin agreement, 1996, to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. Events in 1997-1998 changed that.  
NATO was in this period in the middle of its preparations for the Washington summit, April 1999, 
which included the definition of a new “Strategic Concept.” In May 1998 NATO foreign ministers 
simply noted that they had discussed “themes” to be included in this new concept. Half a year later, 
when a final outline was to be agreed, disagreement erupted. The conclusions of the North Atlantic 
Council 8 December 1998 were very broad, simply stating that the new Strategic Concept should be 
“consistent” with NATO’s new security environment, while reaffirming the commitment to collective 
defense (NATO 1998, paragraph 5). The problem lay in the interpretation of the security environment. 
European governments were generally focused on the European region and Yugoslav-style conflicts: 
NATO therefore needed to have a continued distinct regional focus and military crisis management 
capabilities.  
The US looked beyond Europe and also beyond military crisis management. US Secretary of State 
Albright was particularly adamant that NATO needed to focus on threats to members’ vital interests, 
irrespective of the nature of these threats (Daily Telegraph and New York Times, 9 December 1998). 
While Europe looked to the Balkans, the US looked to terrorist attacks on American embassies in 
                                                 
20 The BBC reported in June 2001 that Great Britain had been upset by American unilateralism in the Balkans, 
notably as Great Britain was cut off from American intelligence sources and headquarters in Bosnia were bugged 
by US intelligence. Former UN commander British General Michael Rose recalls, “We were always very careful 
in what we said in that office. And if we did say something, it was with deliberate intent.” BBC News, “Deceiving 
your allies”, 22 June 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/audiovideo/programmes/correspondent 
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Kenya and Tanzania, North Korean missile tests, all in August 1998, as well as a renewed air war over 
Iraq in October 1998. 
European governments were naturally capable of perceiving the American situation but they were also 
pulled back into the Balkans by the unfolding crisis in Kosovo during 1998. As General Wesley Clark 
(2001, 112), SACEUR at the time, recalls, European foreign ministers, including particularly the 
British and German, were determined in early 1998 to prevent another “Balkan tragedy.” Plans for an 
air operation were ready in June 1998, and they came close to unleashing a series of strikes in October 
1998. Richard Holbrooke, the Dayton architect, had been negotiating in parallel, however, and 
managed to have Serb President Milosovic sign an agreement. The agreement was eventually violated 
and NATO commenced a bombing campaign in March 1999. But Holbrooke’s diplomacy, reminiscent 
of the Dayton debacle, had “annoyed” European governments (Hoffmann 2000, 194). France and 
Britain criticized the US for giving in too much in favor of the UCK, the Serbs’ opponents, and for 
pushing too hard for a bombing campaign outside a diplomatic framework (Information, 30 January 
1999). Again, the parallel to Euro-US disputes over Bosnia is obvious, and the US (along with the 
Contact Group of great powers) revealingly handed France and Britain the task of conducting peace 
negotiations in February-March 1999.21 
It was in the midst of these diverging security perceptions that the St. Malo agreement came about. The 
ESDP was needed to make the EU more credible on its own as well as in the eyes of American 
decision-makers. Tony Blair was in no doubt concerning this dual motive in October 1998.22 “Nothing 
must happen that in any way impinges on the effectiveness of NATO.” However, Britain should be 
able to “put together an operation with, say, France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, in a way that meant we 
did not have to rely the whole time on the Americans.” French President Chirac put the emphasis on 
European autonomy. The ESDP represents an important step toward “the presence of the EU on the 
international stage, with a real foreign and defense policy that the European states are capable of 
implementing themselves” (Libération, 5-6 December 1998). 
 
US NATO Policy under Pressure 
The new French-British consensus was fragile but American policy-makers focused rather on its 
threatening potential. Secretary of State Albright was quick to outline the conditions of three “D’s” for 
the sake of protecting NATO: no de-coupling, no discrimination, and no duplication (Albright 1998). 
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, warned in October 1999 against the perspective that the 
European defense capability “comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and 
finally grows away from NATO” (Talbott 1999). 
A similar effort to bolster NATO was visible in the efforts of US Secretary of Defense Cohen who in 
mid-1998 focused on military capabilities and notably the growing gap across the Atlantic. European 
                                                 
21 In addition, France took command of the “extradition force” deployed to Macedonia in the fall of 1998 for the 
purpose of backing up OSCE observers in Kosovo. 
22 BBC News, ‘UK, Blair backs EU defence arm’, 21 October 1998, 
http://news.bb.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newid_197000/197887.stm 
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governments perceived this gap as well as Cohen did, and they supported his idea of strengthening 
NATO’s defense planning process. However, he had not foreseen and could not prevent EU 
governments from setting up a new parallel and independent force planning mechanism (i.e., the 
Helsinki Headline Goal process).  
Cohen’s idea was to make NATO the centerpiece in capability reform, and he therefore outlined in 
June 1998 the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that was later adopted at the NATO summit, April 
1999. The DCI was designed to shake up NATO defense planning. In Cohen’s words (1998), NATO 
must “ensure that the vision of the Strategic Concept” is “better reflected in the daily work” of the 
Alliance. DCI therefore grafted a High Level Steering Group onto the regular planning process and 
charged it with the task of promoting 58 reform priorities (i.e., 58 different military capabilities) linked 
to mobility, interoperationability, and sustainability. As late as in October 2000 Cohen (2000) 
envisioned and called for a “unitary, coherent, and collaborative” approach to defense planning in the 
form of a “European Security and Defense Planning System (ESDPS).” This ESDPS did not 
materialize, as mentioned, because the EU started operating in parallel. 
There are two particular reasons for this defeat of US NATO policy. One is the political divergence 
that had produced the St. Malo agreement and that led to the “Berlin Plus” agreement in April 1999 by 
which NATO agreed to assist the EU in a number of respects.23 Berlin Plus builds on the Berlin 
agreement of 1996 but also goes further in that the European pillar now operates outside of NATO. The 
determination to reshape the Alliance was boosted by the Kosovo war, which took place during the 
April 1999 summit, and which demonstrated difficulties in operating militarily as an Alliance in crisis 
management. While there was no consensus on using or threatening to use ground troops, Clinton’s 
refusal to do so was particularly troubling to the strongest advocate of such an option, Britain’s Tony 
Blair.24 Moreover, the difficulty of coordinating national policies in respect to bombing targets – lists 
of which were decided by negotiation – produced a very graduated bombing campaign. This timidity 
stood in stark contrast to the decisive attack plans urged by the US Department of Defense, notably 
focusing on a full-scale invasion aiming at Belgrade or a full-scale “strategic” bombing campaign. 
Pentagon plans for decisive strikes against the enemy’s “center of gravity” clashed with European 
visions of crisis management. The result was NATO acrimony and the erosion of the operational 
authority of the American general serving as NATO SACEUR, Wesley Clark (see Clark 2001).  
The other reason is the perceived difficulty of using NATO as a mechanism for generating new 
European capabilities. The fact that NATO is an entrenched organization in need of some reform is 
reflected in Secretary Cohen’s DCI program. Also, and revealingly, the Berlin Plus agreement (see 
                                                 
23 The Berlin Plus agreement contains four points (NATO 1999, paragraph 10).. (A) Assured EU access to NATO 
planning capabilities. (B) The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and 
assets. (C) Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the 
role of DSACEUR. (D) The further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system to incorporate more 
comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. 
24 The role of the Clinton administration is subject to controversy. Stanley Sloan (2001, 20) believes that the 
administration as a leader of NATO may be responsible for the prolonged air war but also that the basic problem 
was one of alliance disunity. Christopher Layne (2000, 17-18) argues to the contrary that the administration, due to 
“misinterpretations of Balkan history” and “flawed” readings, was largely responsible for a bombing campaign 
based on “miscalculations.” 
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footnote XX) stated that the planning system needs to be “further adapted.” Defense planning and 
capability reform became a central issue as the Kosovo campaign displayed the marked gap in 
American and European capabilities. Some would argue that the gap in part was due to the way in 
which the campaign was carried out – that the air strategy was in distinct disfavor of European forces. 
Still, there was no doubt that the gap existed. Coupled with the widespread perception that NATO may 
be difficult to reform, EU members sought inspiration in the “convergence criteria” that previously had 
produced the common currency, the Euro. Why not use the EU as a “convergence mechanism” to 
produce new military capabilities? 
Britain and France were early enthusiasts of the “convergence criteria” process. Britain along with Italy 
proposed in July 1999 the articulation of “European-wide goals” that would be “monitored by peer 
review” (Howorth 2000, 40). The French minister of defense, Alain Richard, supported the idea 
because it “can effectively incite European states to maintain or attain a credible and durable level of 
defense capability” (Le Monde, 14 July 1999). These designs then gave birth to the Helsinki Headline 
Goal of December 1999 and led to the (ongoing) development of a Capability Development 
Mechanism (CDM) within the EU. 
NATO lost momentum in the period 1998-2001 because US strategic support waned or was channeled 
into positions poorly coordinated with European policy, especially in the case of the Kosovo 
intervention. NATO, moreover, did not become the single host to the European pillar, which otherwise 
appeared to be the case in 1996-1997, because the EU was seen as a more effective framework for 
achieving the capabilities that European governments needed. The outcome was a NATO in the 
balance, representing divergent political perspectives and witnessing the development of a parallel 
force planning mechanism. The outcome was also a European defense dimension in the shape of the 
ESDP that appeared set to develop the full range of policy, organization, and capabilities needed to 
carry out the Petersberg tasks on the peripheries of Europe. Defense “autonomy” was thus rooted in a 
distinct European security perspective (i.e., Petersberg) carved out in opposition to global US concerns 
(i.e., terrorism, regional wars, and WMD). The role of military forces would be different from 
traditional strategic operations in that they would be integrated with civilian components to form part 
of a larger crisis management and conflict resolution policy. 
 
Emancipation or New Division of Labor? 
European governments did not take the lead in the Kosovo air war but their dominance of the 
subsequent NATO peacekeeping force as well as the articulation of the ESDP led to the belief that the 
trajectory toward autonomy had crystallized. The self-evident need to work in partnership with the US 
in cases of large operations, based on the Berlin Plus agreement, would naturally circumscribe this 
autonomy. But still, the trend toward autonomy could appear ineluctable. In this section I offer an 
assessment of counter-trends: terrorist and other asymmetric threats, new US security priorities, and 
EU enlargement. We must ask whether the US will seek to revitalize NATO cooperation, and whether 
the strategic and tactical support for the EU is likely to continue. 
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A New American Security Agenda 
The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 changed the security perspective of the US. Regional wars 
now have to give way to asymmetrical threats defined by states of concern (also known as rogue states) 
and non-state groups and their efforts to have the US fight wars it is not prepared for. At the heart of 
these threats, arguably, lie terrorism and also the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The 
current administration is also intensely focused on the possibility that the latter may be delivered by 
ballistic missiles, a scenario providing the rationale for a missile defense.  
It is important to note, however, that the terrorist attack accelerated policies already under 
consideration in the Bush administration. George W. Bush had campaigned against his predecessor’s 
focus on crisis management, derisively labeled “nation-building,” and promised to channel money into 
missile defense and new technology for new types of war. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
that was published just weeks after the terrorist attack thus blended new thinking with the new attack 
(Pentagon 2001, page V): 
In important ways, these attacks [September 11] confirm the strategic direction and 
planning principles that resulted from this review, particularly its emphasis on homeland 
defense, on surprise, on preparing for asymmetrical threats, on the need to develop new 
concepts of deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need to 
balance deliberately the different dimensions of risk. However, the attack on the United 
States on September 11, 2001 will require us to move forward more rapidly in these 
directions, even while we are engaged in the war against terrorism. 
A strategy based on capabilities is a challenge for transatlantic relations. The strategy, as the name 
indicates, will not be overtly concerned with specific actors and their intentions but will focus on 
capabilities. Such a capability may be WMD, such as biological weapons or small nuclear weapons, or 
a network infrastructure enabling terrorists to strike decisively in unexpected ways. This line of 
thinking naturally reaches the conclusion that a failure to provide a defense against such capabilities is 
amoral and irresponsible.  
European diplomacy is traditionally focused on actors and their intentions, partly because this has been 
a classical approach to strategic analysis, partly because European governments never had the 
possibility to insure themselves against all capabilities. In a dense and interdependent strategic 
environment it made more sense to identify the revisionist – the actor who might use lethal capabilities 
– and then deter, contain, or defeat him.  
European governments have not, of course, been blind to the American predicament in the case of 
global terrorism. By invoking NATO’s Article 5 they instantly recognized that the September attack 
had been an attack on all (NATO 2001a). In so doing they also upset the compromise reached in April 
1999 concerning NATO’s primary purpose. European governments had succeeded in placing two new 
priorities into the “fundamental security tasks” of NATO: crisis management (akin to Petersberg) and a 
limited geographical focus: the “Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO 1999, paragraph 10). The American 
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agenda concerning terrorism and WMD, strongly promoted by Secretary Albright in December 1998, 
was relegated to a less important section of the Strategic Concept, “Security challenges and risks” 
(paragraphs 20-24). In the wake of the September attack and the Article 5 declaration there is no doubt 
that these “challenges” are at least as important and probably more so than the “fundamental task” of 
crisis management. Moreover, the new challenges are global and cannot be confined to the “Euro-
Atlantic” area.  
The US focuses on global threats and pushes NATO partners to do likewise. US President W. Bush has 
repeatedly spoken of a global confrontation between pro- versus anti-American forces. Other actors 
may still develop regional policies focused on other problems but they will have to take this 
confrontation into consideration. The issue was underscored by the Director of Policy Planning at the 
State Department, Richard Haas, who previously was seen, like his immediate superior, Colin Powell, 
as a counterweight to the worldview of “hawks” like Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
and his superior, Donald Rumsfeld. Haas noted that there is now a successor idea to containment 
(quoted in Lemann 2002, 46): 
It is the idea of integration. The goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to persuade the 
other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: 
opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, 
democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then 
building institutions that lock them in even more. 
The message for European governments is fairly straightforward. The European security pillar must not 
grow out of NATO but should instead serve to strengthen NATO and global US security policy. 
Europe will be expected to provide diplomatic as well as military support for this US policy while 
taking greater responsibility for crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area.25 The US will insist that 
the Atlantic status quo must be upheld and the ESDP must be integrated with NATO.  
US policy is also revisionist, however, because the Bush administration is demanding European 
support for a new NATO, more global and focused on asymmetric threats. This revisionist substance is 
the key point here, and we must now assess whether European allies are more likely to support US 
designs or organize in opposition to them. 
 
The EU: Cohesion under Siege 
There are several reasons to suspect that the cohesion underpinning the ESDP is under severe pressure. 
One is the US demand that the European governments must look beyond Petersberg-type crisis 
management and engage the combat of asymmetric threats. The Petersberg agenda and ambition 
developed previously as a niche specialty with warfare in the former Yugoslavia serving to remind all 
actors involved that the ambition was important. Rather than reinforcing this focus, new asymmetric 
                                                 
25 The European Union Select Committee of the British House of Lords thus concluded in January 2002 that “US 
forces might withdraw from Bosnia” and “European governments will need to do more to provide for their own 
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warfare challenges it. Moreover, the ESDP did build on a convergence between French strategic and 
British tactical considerations, and it is not clear that they will see eye to eye in the new security 
context. Finally, ESDP cohesion is challenged by EU enlargement, which is likely to take place in 2004 
or 2005 with up to ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe. More countries with very different 
historical experiences compared to current EU members will make it more difficult to reach agreement 
on substantial “Common Strategies” as well as the purpose, scope, and duration of possible military 
actions. In June 1999 Stanley Hoffmann (1999) pinpointed the problem. An agreement between 
France, Britain, and Germany is insufficient: the EU must quickly “abandon the principle of unanimity 
that allows a ‘small’ state fearful of cold water or a ‘big’ preferring to swim longer but alone to block 
everything.”  
These challenges bring the issue of flexible cooperation to the forefront. The Treaty of Nice brought 
significant advances in this domain by introducing the concept of “enhanced cooperation” (EU 2001, 
article 27) that – within some constraints – allows some EU members to act separately.26 However, the 
member states have denied this possibility in the defense dimension (article 27b): enhanced 
cooperation “shall not relate to matters having military or defense implications.” The reader will at this 
stage recall that the Amsterdam Treaty already prevented “joint action” by qualified majority voting, 
on the basis of unanimously adopted strategies, in the areas having, again, military or defense 
implications. EU member states have tied themselves to a demanding defense agenda: either they 
march in unity, or they do not march. 
Will the EU be able to march in unity, either with or against the US, or will the ESDP simply whither 
because countries choose to take action elsewhere? The Nice Treaty (Article 17.4), it should be noted, 
allows such action: 
The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation 
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western 
European Union (WEU) or NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or 
impede that provided for in this Title. 
Parallel action, in case-by-case coalitions may indeed be the most likely scenario because the strategic 
cohesion of the EU is weakening. 
France and Great Britain have both supported the ESDP as a measure to enhance governmental control 
of EU external affairs – and indeed internal affairs. Neither is likely to support supranationalism in this 
pillar as a first step toward the federal finalité that German Foreign Minister Fischer has outlined and 
which some observers may hope that the current EU Convention will promote. France continues to 
cultivate on the one hand intergovernmentalism (often labeled a “Europe of nations”) and on the other 
the idea of a European “core” setting the pace for the common whole. Britain has not warmed to 
federalist thoughts either; and it entered the ESDP, as noted above, to strengthen the EU-NATO 
                                                                                                                                            
security, especially on the borders of Europe where US interests are not directly engaged” (House of Lords 2002, 
paragraph 16). 
26 The most important constraints are that the particular action must: 1) serve the interests of “the Union as a 
whole,”  2) include as a minimum eight countries, and 3) be open to the participation of all member states. 
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connection.27 Moreover, in May 2002 Britain and France agreed to “demand the creation of a powerful 
new president of the European Council” to “serve as the EU’s face in international affairs and take a 
key role in developing defence and foreign policies” (Financial Times, May 15, 2002). This 
intergovernmental design, not coordinated with Germany, is clearly intended to strengthen their control 
of the ESDP and counter notably the Commission’s more federalist design (Le Monde, May 18, 2002). 
This British-French unity rests in part on the belief that actors in world politics must be able to fall 
back on military force and coercion. Britain is the most capable military actor in Europe and has no 
plans of changing emphasis. The 2001 paper Future Strategic Context (Britain 2001), which updated 
the Blair government’s 1997 Strategic Defence Review, thus echoed American ways of war by stating 
that Britain “will want to fight from a distance as long as possible.” In another paper from 2001, the 
Defense Department noted that “high intensity combat is a priority.” Britain was the most active ally 
next to the US in the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and revealingly also the only ally to gain physical 
access to the US military headquarters in Tampa, Florida.  
France has since the mid-1990s sought to follow in British footsteps in the area of military reform. 
Small but important gains have been made. The Kosovo defense review of the French government 
noted that French air forces were first (au premier rang) among European forces, that France 
participated in all NATO ground operations, and that it was the only European country to employ the 
full range of intelligence gathering platforms (France 1999, introduction). 
With the emphasis on “power politics” France and Britain are clearly distinguishing themselves from 
the remainder of the EU. Former French Foreign Minister Védrine noted in 1997 that apart one or two 
other countries, “no European country thinks like us.” European countries generally “abhor the idea of 
power” either because they are small and long ago turned their back to power politics or thrive on 
economic relations and now find power politics “almost obscene” (1997, 181). This conclusion still 
stands. Moreover, as a national official argued (in interview with author, April 2002), as long as the 
neutral or non-aligned countries (i.e., Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Ireland)28 along with other small 
countries have a say in the ESDP they will oppose the use of enhanced cooperation in order to prevent 
the development of a great power directorate. 
Germany plays a pivotal role in the broadening of the ESDP base beyond France and Britain. 
Traditionally seen as a “civilian power” and a “trading state,” Germany has since unification gradually 
increased its military presence in operations outside German territory. In the spring of 2002 more than 
10,000 German troops were operating out-of-area, among them elite troops tracking down al-Qaeda 
forces in Afghanistan, and Germany had since the fall of 2001 been in command of the NATO 
operation in Macedonia (The Economist, 4 May 2002, p. 32). This may not amount to a 
                                                 
27 I asked a highly placed British official in January 2002 whether enlargement did not necessitate majority voting 
within the ESDP. The answer was negative in the belief that more countries would not qualitatively change the 
task of generating a consensus within the EU. In short, more members may enter but the political game, allegedly, 
remains the same. 
28 Ireland currently blocks the ratification of the Nice Treaty because it was rejected in a referendum during which 
the EU’s new defense dimension played a large role. 
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“normalization” of Germany but it indicates that the power-dimension of civilian power is under 
development (Philippi 2001, 65). 
But Germany alone will not suffice to mobilize support for a “power Europe” (Europe puissance). 
Such a Europe will emerge only if the ESDP finds popular roots, widely in Europe, as a means to 
address global problems and safeguard common European values (cf. Hoffmann 1999). This is a long-
term vision surrounded by great uncertainty. In the shorter run Europe is likely to be split in strategic 
terms, with the most capable actors, Britain and France, finding it difficult to impregnate power politics 
on its partners while having no Treaty recourse to enhanced cooperation. 
 
In Search of a Force Multiplier 
Strategic disunity does not imply that the rationale of the ESDP will whither. First of all, there is a 
strong pressure on EU countries to at least consider in what ways crisis management needs military 
support. This will remain the case even if the ESDP does not produce a meaningful military dimension 
in itself but instead must rely on parallel coalitions and/or NATO. Secondly, the ESDP was originally 
seen as being a more efficient and effective mechanism for generating new European military 
capabilities, and this case may still be made with some confidence. 
The Helsinki Headline Goal process has produced the number of troops and equipment that the high-
end Petersberg ambition – peacemaking – demands. This occurred already at a Capabilities 
Commitment Conference in November 2000 in the run-up to the Nice Treaty conference. Shortfalls 
emerged, however, due to the quality of personnel and equipment. These were then addressed at a 
Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2001, and the EU is currently playing host to a 
number of so-called Action Groups, which are voluntary groups of countries joining together to 
produce particular capabilities. Where 144 shortfalls were originally identified, 40 now remain to be 
remedied. 
Great challenges lie ahead. The House of Lords (2001, chapter 2) notes that the remaining shortfalls are 
very costly and demand long procurement cycles, implying that the ESDP will not be fully operational 
before 2008 at the earliest. Moreover, the EU lacks command and control experience and infrastructure 
and will almost inevitably have to delegate command and control to NATO, Britain, or France.29 
Still, compared to NATO’s DCI program the EU is not doing poorly. The program has been criticized 
for spreading priorities too wide. In an alliance of 19 states this may be inevitable but it also hampers 
reform. Too few results have been achieved, which is also the message emerging from NATO defense 
ministers meeting in the NAC. In December 2001 they noted “an urgent need to make more progress in 
the development of more deployable forces to undertake the tasks we have set ourselves in the 
Ministerial Guidance last year” (NATO 2001b, paragraph 3, my italics). This urgent need is reinforced 
by another challenge, which they also underscored, namely to produce not only more deployable forces 
                                                 
29 NATO has designated Deputy SACEUR, always a European general, to arrange command and control options 
for European operations, according to the Berlin Plus agreement. Britain and France could step in as lead-nations, 
using their Permanent Joint Headquarters, but in more limited operations. 
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for intervention but also capabilities able to deal with the “proliferation of NBC weapons and their 
delivery means.” NATO, in short, is not being successful in producing conventional capabilities and 
must now also give priority to new and different capabilities. 
The EU’s advantage may lie in this respect, even though most EU countries are also NATO members. 
The EU has a narrower capability agenda – strictly Petersberg – and a track record of applying 
convergence criteria to obtain results. Other capabilities, such as missile defense, can then be discussed 
in NATO. The ESDP therefore has advantages but they lie in the direction of the “civilian power” 
model where military forces serve largely low-end Petersberg tasks. The ESDP could in principle go 
much further but the reality of strategic disunity, budgetary problems, and the fear that role 
specialization will create dependencies and federalist pressures will inhibit such a development.30 
 
From One Dependency to Another: Transatlantic Cherry-Picking 
The conclusions of this section are that the US policy towards NATO is increasingly revisionist, that 
the countries most strongly supporting an autonomous ESDP lack responses to EU enlargement, but 
that the ESDP can attract support for producing common capabilities. The overall impression is one of 
institutional metamorphosis in which none of the key actors recognize themselves and are willing to 
make decisive investments. The US emphasizes NATO but does not use NATO for its own military 
missions and generally demands European support for a new and global NATO. France continues to 
speak of a strong Europe but is simultaneously keen to be seen as a capable military actor, and 
generally lacks a political response to the widening of the EU. Britain cultivates transatlantic relations 
in the context of the war on terrorism and seems content to let the ESDP provide European capabilities 
for joint action. Germany is redefining both its foreign and military policy, and it is likely to seek a 
compromise between federalist designs for the EU and a continued strong military partnership in 
NATO. 
Rather than autonomy, the outcome is likely to be a new kind of transatlantic dependency in military 
operations. To be sure, the EU has the capacity to handle peacekeeping tasks autonomously. Projection 
and coercion, however, are real challenges that only increase with geographical scope and combat 
intensity.  
The US will continue its stringent focus on new asymmetric threats and exploit to its fullest its ability 
to respond through new technologies and combat operations. European allies will participate depending 
on the context, which has two dimensions. First, will the individual ally have something to offer 
militarily? Most allies will have some capability to offer, however minor, particularly special units and 
other niche capabilities. Second, to what extent will the ally and the US agree politically on the purpose 
and scope of the operation?  
                                                 
30 The House of Lords (2002, paragraphs 58 and 66) urge caution on the issue of role specialization. Such 
specialization offers a way to get more military output for the same money but, as the report argues, political 
credibility of the ESDP will be undermined as long as members – with their particular pieces of the force puzzle – 
can opt out. Revealingly, the report does not pursue one logical consequence of this situation, that the EU should 
enhance political integration to make force specialization credible. 
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The US will need to act through international coalitions in most cases31 and will therefore encourage 
countries to join them. But they will pose conditions that are likely to produce tough diplomatic 
negotiations. In a thinly veiled criticism of NATO’s Kosovo war, Secretary Rumsfeld (2002, 31) 
underscores that “wars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure, but they should not be 
fought by committee.” Moreover, the US will want to act in anticipatory self-defense and eliminate 
threats before they strike at the US (or other countries).32 Allies will in consequence find it difficult to 
gain strategic leverage on US decisions. They will not be able to gain much influence via their military 
capabilities but they may gain influence because new wars “increasingly require all elements of 
national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, low enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and 
covert military operations” (Rumsfeld 2002, 30). Strategic influence can thus be shared but it will 
depend on the US realizing that it in fact is engaged in the “nation-building” exercises it once derided 
(i.e., in Afghanistan and possibly soon in Iraq) (see Walt 2001/02, 69) and the EU articulating how its 
broad, non-military means can be employed. But the military dimension will be ad hoc, with the US 
picking cherries – allies and capabilities – to suit the mission. 
 
Conclusion 
The trend toward EU autonomy in defense matters may not be so ineluctable as it appeared in 1999-
2000. The Kosovo war produced widespread political support for the French-British desire for a 
stronger European pillar, born out of frustrations with the US in the former Yugoslavia and also 
NATO’s inability to incite capability reform in Europe. From a convergence of state preferences 
followed the ESDP with a policy focused on Petersberg tasks, new institutions within the EU, and a 
separate force planning mechanism.  
However, the events of September 11, 2001 have exposed underlying tensions among European state 
preferences and the trajectory is likely to change, no longer moving toward autonomy but a new type of 
dependency. The US will offer little support for a security and defense policy that does not reinforce its 
new global strategy, and in this respect its revisionist stance vis-à-vis the European pillar will harden. 
The strategic design for European autonomy will suffer and reside mainly in a military design that 
French policy-makers support rhetorically or a more broadly based design for the EU as a “civilian 
power.” Military operations will occur in ad hoc coalitions that rely on both NATO and EU means, 
thus resulting in a type of institutional interdependence, but US superiority and European weakness 
will in the context of coercion create a new type of military dependency. 
This conclusion is based on an examination of how states respond to new power configurations and 
opportunities and seek to enhance their influence and the scope for their domestically rooted values and 
worldviews. States support institutions such as NATO and the EU depending on the affinity between 
the ideas that these institutions harbor and the interests of states. To the extent that these ideas evolve 
                                                 
31 The exception is represented by the terrorist attack of September 2001 against which the US clearly had a right 
of legitimate self-defense. From a general perspective, however, the US must solicit political support in the UN 
and operational support from coalition allies. 
32 The US appears to be determined to topple the Iraqi regime as a precautionary security policy. 
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away from state interests, the institution will lose support. The US policy on NATO is intended to 
break what US policy-makers perceive as a trend toward irrelevance. Likewise, Western European 
governments are currently realizing the extent to which enlargement of both the EU and NATO have 
changed the rationale of these institutions and thus made strategic support for them difficult. The result 
is a vacuum of leadership and commitment and, as pointed out, new patterns of dependency. A new 
Messina summit may produce a slimmer European security pillar that can establish a new affinity 
between state power and institutional purpose. Messina I occurred ten years following the change of 
world order, in 1945. Messina II has been and will continue to be longer in the waiting. 
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